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Critics of globalization claim that U.S. manufacturing firms are being driven by the prospects of cheaper 
labor to shift employment abroad.  Yet the evidence, beyond anecdotes, is slim.  Using firm-level data 
collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we estimate the impact on U.S. 
manufacturing employment of foreign employment by U.S. firms, controlling for intra-firm trade and 
technological change.  Using several different approaches to estimating labor demand, we find that 
employment in low income countries substitutes for employment at home.  We also find that employment 
in high income affiliates is complementary with U.S. employment.  These results suggest that the location 
of foreign affiliates determines the employment effects of offshoring. U.S. capital investments in both 
high and low income affiliates are associated with a downward shift in labor demand for U.S. 
manufacturing enterprises.    Finally, technological change and intra-firm trade are also important 
determinants of U.S. manufacturing employment. 
I. Introduction 
 During the last three decades, manufacturing employment in the United States has fallen 
steadily.1 Over this same period U.S.-based multinationals increased their foreign activities at a rapid 
pace. These parallel developments have led critics of globalization to conclude that U.S. firms are 
shutting down factories at home and shifting employment abroad. This public outcry has not gone 
unnoticed in Congress. On October 22, 2004 the U.S. Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.  The Act contains a provision to encourage profit repatriation back to the U.S. by domestic 
multinationals--explicitly for the purpose of job creation at home.  
 Why should offshore activities—either through arms-length outsourcing or U.S. outward foreign 
investment—be perceived any differently than international trade in goods?  Just as international trade 
benefits the economy as a whole, but creates both winners and losers in the domestic economy, we would 
expect some winners and losers from offshoring. Yet some recent studies claim that there are no domestic 
employment losses from offshoring activities, suggesting that the effect of outward foreign investment is 
fundamentally different from international trade.  Borga (2005), Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005), and 
Slaughter (2003) find that expansion of U.S. multinationals abroad stimulates job growth at home. 
Slaughter (2003) reports the largest positive effects of offshoring: he suggests that for every new job 
abroad, U.S. employment increases two-fold.2   Reviewing these studies, Mankiw and Swagel (2006) 
conclude that “foreign activity does not crowd out domestic activity; the reverse is true.” 
 A second set of studies (Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003), 
Muendler and Becker (2006)) reaches the opposite conclusion: jobs abroad replace jobs at home, but the 
effect is small. How can we reconcile these different studies? Some of the discrepancies may be due to 
sample selection. For example, Slaughter (2003) reaches opposite conclusions depending on whether he 
uses the entire universe of multinationals or manufacturing alone. Methodological differences may also 
account for some of the discrepancies. Desai et al (2005) examine U.S. employment growth at home as a 
function of employment growth abroad without disaggregating affiliate activity into high and low income 
                                                          
1 Economic Report of the President, 2007. 
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locations.  These different answers to the same question are problematic because policy makers are left 
uncertain as to whether social safety nets for workers displaced by trade competition should be extended 
to workers displaced by multinational activity abroad.  
 In this paper, we resolve the controversy by developing an empirical framework which allows firms 
to simultaneously determine employment and the capital stock at home and abroad. With this framework, 
we are able to separately identify the impact on home employment of affiliate hires in low and high 
income countries, expansion of the capital stock across different locations, changes in intra-firm and 
arms-length trade, and technological change. We address endogeneity problems using instrumental 
variables techniques. Instruments for employment abroad include factors that positively affect labor 
supply and labor productivity in affiliate locations, such as educational attainment and number of personal 
computers per capita.  We also account for sample selection problems: U.S. firms most affected by global 
competition may leave the sample.  To identify determinants of entry and exit which do not belong in the 
labor demand equation, we draw on the recent literature on firm heterogeneity. Finally, to address the 
possibility that methodological differences might be driving the conflicting results described above, we 
adopt a variety of different approaches to estimating labor demand and a range of econometric techniques.   
 We find that some jobs have indeed been "exported abroad," disputing arguments that offshoring 
by U.S. manufacturing firms leads to net job expansion at home.  Yet this is only part of the explanation 
for the sharp contraction in U.S. parent employment. Other quantitatively important determinants of U.S. 
multinational employment include import competition, physical investment abroad by U.S. parents, and 
technological change.  Offshoring affects U.S. manufacturing employment through a direct negative 
impact on domestic labor demand as well as through indirect effects that operate via expansion of the 
affiliate capital stock and greater intra-firm trade. The negative impact of outward investment and intra-
firm trade on U.S. multinational employment is probably twice as important as the negative effects of 
expanding affiliate employment in low-income countries. These results are robust to a variety of 
econometric specifications. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2  Slaughter’s estimates are presented in a recent high profile report released by the government on the consequences 
of offshoring for the US economy. 
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        Our research shows that the impact of affiliate employment on U.S. jobs varies with affiliate 
location. Employment in low-income affiliates substitutes for U.S. employment: the 40 percentage point 
increase in low-income affiliate employment between 1977 and 1999 accounted for a drop in U.S. parent 
manufacturing employment of up to 15 percent. However, employment in high-income affiliates is 
complementary with parent employment.  That complementarity is driven by the fact that employment of 
US multinationals in both the US and in their high-income affiliates contracted, leading to the observed 
positive correlation (reported in Borga (2005) and Desai, Foley and Hines (2005)) between employment 
at home and abroad. These results help to reconcile contradictory findings in the academic literature and 
anecdotal evidence in the popular press of factory closings and falling manufacturing employment. We 
also explore the possibility that access to cheap labor has helped U.S. parents to survive. Our analysis 
suggests that this is likely to be the case: firms with a higher percentage of employees in developing 
countries are more likely to survive.  
 While the literature on the manufacturing employment effects of offshoring is limited, there is a 
more extensive literature on the impact of international trade on U.S. jobs.  Revenga (1992) finds a 
negative impact of changes in import prices on U.S. employment growth.  Katz and Murphy (1992) also 
find that increased import competition negatively affected relative labor demand in the U.S., particularly 
in the 1980s with the burgeoning of the U.S. trade deficit. The different effects of U.S. multinational 
activity on domestic employment outcomes depending on affiliate location is consistent with evidence on 
the employment effects of international trade documented by Borjas, Katz and Freeman (1997) and  
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006). Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) find that increased trade with 
developing countries depresses wages at the bottom of the income distribution. Bernard et al. examine the 
impact of U.S. imports on both the survival and employment of U.S. manufacturing firms. They find that 
imports only harm U.S. manufacturing employment when those imports are from low wage countries.   
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis data on outward direct investment and our choice of sample. In Section III we outline 
broad trends in employment for U.S. parent companies and their affiliates. We also report the correlations 
between expansions and contractions at home and abroad for U.S. multinationals.  Section IV describes 
 3
the empirical framework and discusses econometric issues, including the strategy for identification and 
the proposed correction for selection out of the BEA dataset. Section V presents the results and Section 
VI concludes. 
 
II. The BEA Data 
 
 We analyze the firm-level surveys on U.S. direct investment abroad, collected each year by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The BEA collects 
confidential data on the activities of U.S.-based multinationals, defined as the combination of a single 
U.S. entity that has made the direct investment, called the parent, and at least one foreign business 
enterprise, called the foreign affiliate. We use the data collected on majority-owned, non-bank foreign 
affiliates and non-bank U.S. parents for the benchmark years between 1977 and 1999.  The benchmark 
years are 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1999 and include more comprehensive information than the annual 
surveys. To our knowledge, very little work has been done with the firm-level data using the entire length 
of the time series.3
Creating a panel using the benchmark years of the BEA survey data is a nontrivial task. First, not 
all firms are required to report to the BEA and reporting requirements vary across years. Second, because 
we are interested in understanding what is happening at the industry level, we must consider the 
implications of the changes to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in 1972 and 1987 and the 
switch from SIC codes to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes in 1997. 
The fact that parents are allowed to consolidate information for several affiliates in one country on a 
single form calls for special care in the aggregation and interpretation of affiliate level data. 
All foreign affiliates with sales, assets or net income in excess of a certain amount in absolute 
value must report to the BEA. This amount was $.5 million dollars in 1977, $3 million dollars in 1982, 
                                                          
3   Although the BEA parent identification codes changed between 1977 and 1982, linking parents from 1977 to the 
remaining benchmark years proved relatively straightforward.  This is because in addition to a parent identification 
code created by the BEA (which changed between 1977 and 1982) each parent has an employee identification 
number (EIN) assigned to it by the Internal Revenue Service which did not change during the period 1977-1999.  
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1989 and 1994 and jumped to $7 million dollars in 1999. In addition, a new reporting requirement was 
imposed on parents in 1999. Parents whose sales, assets or net income exceeded $100 million (in absolute 
value) were required to provide more extensive information than parents whose sales, assets or net 
income fell below $100 million.4 To determine whether the changes in reporting requirements biased our 
sample toward small firms in the early years, we imposed a double filter on the data using the uniform 
cutoff for affiliates (based on the strictest reporting requirement of $100 million in 1999) of $5.59 million 
in 1982 U.S. dollars and $79.87 1982 U.S. dollars for parents. As it turns out, the reporting requirements 
were large enough that imposing the filter on the data makes little difference. Therefore, we use all of the 
available actual data. We drop from our sample data that has been “estimated” by the BEA.5
6Finally, there is the issue of how to choose our sample of “manufacturing” firms.  Parent 
employment is classified both by industry of sales (up to ten industries are reported) and by industry of 
employment. Since none of the other data are classified by industry of employment, we choose our 
sample based on industry of sales using only those parents whose primary industry of sales is 
manufacturing. Parents have several affiliates and these affiliates are typically spread across a number of 
industries. We choose only affiliates classified in manufacturing since our goal is to determine whether 
manufacturing jobs at home are being replaced by manufacturing jobs abroad. We further limit the sample 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Using the EIN number, plus the country in which the affiliate operates, we are able to track parent/affiliate pairs 
over time. 
4 Parents who do not meet this cutoff but who have affiliates that meet the $7 million cutoff are still required to 
provide extensive information for affiliates. 
5 This means that we have also dropped firms whose reporting status in that benchmark year is “exempt” (be 11 
code equal to five) since data for these firms are also effectively estimated based on data in the previous benchmark 
survey. 
6 To document what has happened within industries in manufacturing over time, we created a concordance that 
allows us to assign SIC codes to NAICS codes.  This was necessary because in 1999 the BEA collected data on 
NAICS codes and not SIC codes.  We chose to convert SIC codes to NAICS codes since all future information will 
be collected on the basis of NAICS codes.  For example, data for the benchmark year 2004 will be available shortly 
and firms report based on NAICS codes.  The 1977 and 1982 benchmark years are based on the 1972 SIC codes.  
The 1989 and 1994 benchmark years are based on the 1987 SIC codes. The 1999 benchmark data are based on the 
1997 NAICS codes.  In addition to the fact that the industry codes are not directly comparable across all benchmark 
years, the BEA industry codes have been slightly modified to reflect the fact that these are enterprise data and are 
called, respectively, SIC-ISI and NAICS-ISI.  Working with these codes, we created a program (available upon 
request) that assigns the SIC-ISI codes for the years 1977-1994 to NAICS-ISI codes.  Both parents and affiliates are 
classified into their primary industry of sales using the following algorithm, which tracks the algorithm used by the 
BEA: the top five industries by parent or affiliate sales are used to assign to each parent or affiliate one of the 22 
aggregates.  Sales are collapsed into the top five industries of sales and then the maximum sale by industry is 
identified.  A parent or affiliate is classified as being in manufacturing if its maximum sales across the top five 
industries of sales is in manufacturing. 
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to parents whose affiliates report non-zero production employment which allows us to identify the effects 
of hiring both non-production and production workers on U.S. employment.  
There are a number of parents who have been reclassified from manufacturing to wholesale trade 
and services. For example, several firms were in manufacturing but are now classified in wholesale trade 
because almost all of their manufacturing is done overseas and not in the United States. To account for 
this, we chose our sample in two different ways. First, we included parents who either were classified in 
manufacturing or had previously been classified in manufacturing and their manufacturing affiliates. 
Next, we included only parents who were currently in manufacturing in any given year and their 
manufacturing affiliates. Since the results are not sensitive to this distinction, we use the larger of the two 
samples, keeping all parents that were ever classified in manufacturing and their manufacturing affiliates. 
While the number of U.S. parents included in the BEA sample may appear small (see Table 1), 
these enterprises accounted for the majority of economic activity in U.S. manufacturing during the sample 
period.  Appendix Table A.1 updates a table by Mataloni and Fahim-Nader (1996) to 1999 and reports the 
coverage of the BEA data for benchmark years 1982 through 1999.7  In 1982, sales by these enterprises 
accounted for over 84 percent of total manufacturing sales in the United States.  These enterprises also 
accounted for 53 percent of all exports of goods, and 66 percent of employment in manufacturing.  
However, the share of these firms as a share of total U.S. economic activity over the period has declined. 
Appendix Table A.1 shows that in 1999, these enterprises accounted for only 58 percent of U.S. 
manufacturing sales and 44 percent of employment. These firms continued to account for most of U.S. 
research and development expenditures throughout the sample period: in the 1980s and 1990s, Mataloni 
and Fahim-Nader (1996) show that the U.S. parents included in the BEA sample accounted for over 80 
percent of total private U.S. research and development expenditures. 
Appendix Table A.1 also shows that the proportion of services firms accounted for by the BEA 
sample is extremely small.  In 1982, the BEA sample accounted for only 1 percent of service sector 
employment and three percent of gross product.  By 1999, the BEA sample still accounted for only 2 
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percent of service sector employment and only six percent of gross product in services.  Consequently, 
using that sample to infer broad trends in services could be misleading, and is certainly not representative 
of the majority of the service industry in the United States.  What the numbers in Appendix Table A.1 
suggest is that multinationals account for a very small share of U.S. activity in services, and a much larger 
share of U.S. activity in manufacturing. 
How reliable are these data?  These are the only data officially collected by a U.S. government 
agency on affiliate activity abroad.  We have initiated a number of data checks to analyze the reliability of 
the coverage.8  First, we contacted Statistics Canada to check whether they record information on 
affiliates of U.S. multinationals in Canada, which would allow us to cross-check U.S. data on foreign 
affiliates there with Canadian data on inward foreign investment.  Statistics Canada informed us that they 
do not gather data on affiliates because it is too difficult to define a foreign affiliate and referred us to the 
BEA.  We were, however, able to cross-check the employment numbers for U.S. affiliate activity reported 
by the BEA with data on inward foreign investment reported by the official statistical agencies in 
Germany and Sweden.  These checks are reported in Appendix Table A.2.  We report total employment in 
both countries as indicated by the BEA database and show that it is quite close to the same numbers 
collected by the national statistical agencies.  Although there are some discrepancies, it is important to 
note that the fiscal year for U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates does not always correspond to the 
calendar year: the BEA classifies a firm in 1999 if its fiscal year ends in 1999—this could be for any 
month in 1999.  Although most firms have their fiscal year ending in December, enough have earlier end 
dates that some of the 1999 BEA employment figures correspond to a mix of the 1998 and 1999 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 See the December 1996 issue of The Survey of Current Business, “Operation of US Multinational Companies: 
Preliminary Results from the 1994 Benchmark Survey,” by Mataloni and Fahim-Nader, as well as the authors’ own 
calculations. 
8 We are particularly grateful to Marc Muendler and Karolina Eckholm for helping us do this cross-checking.  They 
provided the data on the activities of US multinational affiliates in Germany and Sweden. 
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III. Trends in Employment: 1977-1999 
  
 Table 1 shows that between 1977 and 1999 the multinational manufacturing firms in our sample 
shed 4 million jobs in the United States.9  The contraction in employment in the U.S. has been mirrored 
by job reductions (for the period between 1977 and 1999) or job stagnation (for the period between 1982 
and 1999) for affiliates in developed countries. In developed country affiliates, employment fell by 
roughly half a million between 1977 and 1999. Real wages in both the U.S. and in developed country 
affiliates increased, with the averages suggesting a 22 percent increase in real wages between 1977 and 
1999 in the U.S. and a 29 percent increase in real wages during the same period in developed country 
affiliates.  The job losses in the U.S. and in developed country affiliates have been only partially offset by 
an increase in the number of jobs in developing countries, where the number of jobs increased by half a 
million between 1977 and 1999. Unlike in the developed countries, real wages paid by U.S. based 
multinationals to employees in their developing country affiliates have fallen. The evidence for the U.S. 
parents is in line with the aggregate trends in the U.S. manufacturing sector derived from the NBER 
Manufacturing Productivity Database.  
There has been a substantial shift in activity from developed to developing country affiliates. 
Affiliate employment as a share of global employment increased from 28 percent in 1977 to nearly 36 
percent in 1999.  The increase was almost entirely driven by a doubling of affiliate employment shares in 
developing countries, from 8 to 15 percent.  Affiliate employment in developed countries, as a share of 
total worldwide employment, remained roughly constant over the entire period at around 20 percent.  
Affiliate share of employee compensation and investment also total increased as a result of increased 
activity in developing countries.  
The contraction in domestic jobs in the manufacturing sector has been more than offset by job 
creation in the services sector. Table 2 shows that between 1977 and 1999, employment by U.S. parents 
                                                          
9 The variables we use are reported to the BEA on the basis of the fiscal year.  General trends in employment 
weighted averages are reported in Table 1 for manufacturing and in Table 2 for services.  The numbers in Table 2 
include all firms classified in services under the SIC classification prior to 1997 and under the NAICS system post-
1997.  Because the NAICS system classifies some industries as services that were not previously classified as 
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in the sample increased by more than 4 million or 802 percent. This increase reflects both expansion by 
existing services multinationals and the fact that U.S. services enterprises are entering the BEA database 
by increasing affiliate activity. Expansion at home has been accompanied by expansion abroad. In 
developed country affiliates employment increased from 73 thousand in 1977 to 1.2 million in 1999 and 
in developing country affiliates employment rose from 24 thousand in 1977 to 363 thousand in 1999. 
While the share of affiliate activity still accounts for a much smaller share than affiliate activity in 
manufacturing, it has grown much more rapidly in services. Except for affiliate share of compensation, 
this increase in overseas activity has been fairly evenly spread between developed and developing country 
affiliates.  
 While the contraction in employment in the manufacturing sector may have been offset by 
employment increases in the service sector,  between 1977 and 1999 real compensation per worker in 
services amounted to roughly half of real compensation per worker in the manufacturing sector. This may 
be partly a reflection of the change in the mix of workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector—if unskilled 
U.S. workers have been replaced by unskilled foreign workers then the average wage in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector reflects the wages of skilled workers. However, the fact that this differential existed 
even in 1977 before the big contraction in U.S. manufacturing suggests that this is not the only reason for 
the difference.  Since time-series data on the composition of employment for U.S. parents is not available, 
it is difficult to reach any strong conclusions on this point.    
 We now turn to a discussion of broad trends in the pattern of manufacturing employment changes 
in U.S. parents and their affiliates.  We restrict our analysis to the period 1982 to 1999 for comparability 
with the work by Brainard and Riker (1997, 2001) and Desai et al. (2005) who used these same data 
beginning in 1982.10 As a first test of whether U.S. parents are substituting U.S. employment with 
affiliate employment, we created a series of employment offsets at the industry level.   Figure 1 shows 
employment offsets aggregated to the 3-digit level for the manufacturing sector.  Changes in parent (U.S.) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
services, the employment numbers are slightly exaggerated.  However, when we restrict our analysis of services to 
only those sub-categories that can be exactly matched across years, we get nearly identical trends. 
10 If we extend the period to 1977 and redo the results for 1977 to 1999 the results look similar though we lose some 
of our variables.  In addition, if we use 1977 we are unable to correct for selection bias since no electronic version of 
the data exists prior to 1977. 
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employment are indicated by the horizontal axis and changes in affiliate employment are indicated by the 
vertical axis.  A point in the upper right-hand quadrant indicates expansion both at home and abroad.  A 
point in the lower left-hand side quadrant indicates contraction at home and abroad.  Substitution occurs if 
data points are either in the upper left-hand quadrant (indicating contraction at home and expansion in 
affiliate employment) or in the lower right-hand quadrant (indicating expansion at home and contraction 
abroad).  Fears over offshoring are centered on supposed activity in the upper left-hand quadrant, which 
would indicate expansion of affiliate employment and contraction of employment in the U.S.; so-called 
substitution of foreign for U.S. jobs.  As Figure 1 shows, most of the activity of U.S. manufacturing 
multinational enterprises has taken place in the lower left-hand quadrant, indicating employment 
contraction both at home and abroad. 
 Figures 2 and 3 separate changes in employment from 1982 to 1999 based on the location of the 
parent’s affiliates.  Figure 2 reports employment offsets at the 3 digit level for developed country 
affiliates and parents; Figure 3 reports the same trends for developing country affiliates.  The trends are 
similar across Figures 1 and 2:  employment in high-income affiliates and parent employment are 
complementary but that relationship is driven by the contraction in manufacturing. However, Figure 3 
reveals that employment in low-income affiliates substitutes for employment at home. Moreover, the 
downward sloping regression line appears to be driven by contraction in two key sectors: computers and 
electronics.  
  
IV. Empirical Framework and Identification Issues 
 
Previous work has used a variety of approaches to test for the impact of foreign affiliate activity 
on labor demand at home, making it difficult to identify whether the conflicting results stem from 
different approaches or different datasets and time periods.  Brainard and Riker (1997) estimate labor 
demand as a function of wages in different locations, Desai et al (2005) estimate a reduced form equation 
with log labor at home as a function of log labor abroad, and Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson, 
Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) and Muendler and Becker (2006) use a translog cost function approach to 
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derive factor shares as a function of wages in different locations. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card 
(2001), focusing on the effects of immigration and trade, both use a CES functional form to derive an 
equilibrium relationship between the ratio of employment at home to employment abroad and the ratio of 
wages at home to wages abroad. We begin by deriving an empirical framework based on factor quantities, 
which are directly observable in our dataset. For purposes of comparison with previous work and as a 
robustness check we also derive estimating equations using these other approaches.   
 
Framework Based on Factor Quantities 
Consider a representative firm that has the choice of producing either at home (h), or abroad (f). 
To simplify the analysis we restrict ourselves to two locations, but in our empirical estimation we will 
allow for sales and production in three locations – home, low-income countries and high-income 
countries. We assume that firm i’s global production function, omitting time subscripts, can be described 
in the following way:  
ββ −= 1)1( iiii LKAQ  
where Q is total output, and K and L are total capital (and other non-labor inputs) and labor employed and 
A represents Hicks neutral technological change.   
 We introduce the possibility of production in various locations in the following way: 
),()2( fhi LLgL =  
),()3( fhi KKfK = . 
We do not impose functional forms on (2) and (3) to acknowledge the fact that labor (capital) at home and 
labor (capital) abroad could be perfect complements (the Leontief aggregation), perfect substitutes (a 
linear function) or something in between (the CES class of functions). This framework is flexible enough 
to allow for a range of production technologies, including Brainard and Riker’s (2001) assumption that 
production is vertically decomposed across high-wage and low-wage regions. Nor is our empirical 
approach restricted to the framework in (2) and (3): we could also have assumed a purely horizontal 
decomposition across locations, with Q at home equal to g(Lh,K ) and Q abroad equal to f(L ,K ). h f f
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The firm maximizes the following global profit function:  
ffhhffhhiii KrKrLwLwQP −−−−=π)4(  
Where iπ  is the firms’ total profits,  is a function of prices received at home and abroad and is the 
firms’ total output. 
iP iQ
Since we are interested in labor demand and wages in the U.S., we maximize (4) with respect to 
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Equations (5) and (6) implicitly define the following labor demand function: 
),,,,,()7( iifhfhh APKKLwzL = , 
where the sign of the derivatives of Lh with respect to its arguments depends on the functional forms 
assumed in (2) and (3). For example, if the aggregation in (2) is Leontief, then labor at home and labor 
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constraint. The opposite extreme is the case in which labor at home and labor abroad are perfect 
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L , investment abroad reduces the demand for labor 
at home if investment abroad and investment at home are substitutes. If investment abroad and investment 
at home are perfect complements then the impact of investment abroad on the demand for labor at home 
depends on which is the binding constraint. If investment abroad is the binding constraint, then it should 
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have a positive impact on domestic employment, otherwise it will have no effect. In the polar extreme 
where investment abroad and investment at home are perfect substitutes then investment abroad will have 
a negative impact on home labor demand through its impact on domestic investment.  
 Equation (7) makes clear that estimating employment at home as a function of foreign 
employment without controlling for capital inputs, productivity shocks and demand shocks both at home 
and abroad is likely to lead to biased or incorrect estimates. To the extent that final goods prices are 
influenced by demand abroad (for example, affiliates may sell in local markets), using foreign demand 
shocks as instruments for labor employed abroad could exacerbate simultaneity bias.  
 To derive our wage equation, we assume that labor supply at home is an upward sloping function 
of home wages ( ) and time effects (possibly associated with increasing educational opportunities 
common across industries but changing over time) so that: 
hw
 
(8) ( , )h hL s t w= .  
 
Labor market clearing implies the following reduced form equations for employment: 
 
(9) ( , , , , , )h f h f i iL q L K K P A t=  
 
Our first set of estimating equations is based on log-linearization of (9) and takes the following form: 
 
0(10) log iht j ijt j ijt hj ijt j ijt t i ijt
j j j h j
L P A L K d fβ α β γ ω
≠
= + + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ε  
where log L is the net annual log employment by the U.S. parent in the United States, P are final goods 
prices, A represents technological change, L is log of foreign employment for the U.S. parent and K is the 
log of the capital stock. We allow for time effects d and a firm-specific (common to the parent and its 
affiliate) fixed effect f , which takes into account both firm-specific productivity differences and other i
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non-varying firm characteristics, while j indexes location and t indexes time. We divide the locations in 
which U.S. firms can do business into high-income and low-income locations. 
 For comparison with work by Brainard and Riker (2001) we replace labor demand abroad with 
wages abroad on the right-hand side of equation (10) to obtain the following estimating equation: 
 
0(11) ln lniht j ijt j ijt hj jt j ijt t i ijt
j j j j
L P A w K d fβ α β η ω= + + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ε  
where L is U.S. employment now expressed as a function of wages at home and abroad in addition to the 
other controls included earlier.  
 
Framework Based on a Translog Cost Function Approach  
 An alternative framework based on a translog cost function for estimating the impact of foreign 
competition on domestic employment has been adopted by Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson, Mataloni 
and Slaughter (2003) and Muendler and Becker (2006).  This alternative approach has the advantage that 
the translog cost function approximates many well behaved cost functions.  The disadvantage lies in the 
way the approach has been implemented:  most recent applications assume a short-run cost function, and 
allow capital K and technology A to be predetermined.  Nevertheless, we also report results using this 
approach for the sake of completeness.  Following the previous work cited above, we assume that short-
run costs are determined by labor costs in various locations.  Consequently, the short-run translog variable 
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Differentiating ln TVC with respect to ln Wj according to Shepard’s lemma, and allowing for a firm fixed 
effect, yields labor share in location j for parent i at time t: 
0(13) ln ln ln lnijt j ijt j ijt j jt j ijt i ijt
j j j j
LSHARE Y A w K fβ ρ κ ξ ϑ= + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ε . 
where LSHARE is defined as the cost share of labor expenditures in location j for parent i in time t, 
relative to expenditures on labor across all locations.11
 
Framework Based on a CES Input Function Approach  
 For comparison with a popular approach adopted by labor economists (see Katz and Murphy 
(1992) or Card (2001)) and to check the robustness of our results, we also consider aggregating capital 
and labor across locations using a CES function. Thus we define L and K as follows: 
1 1





















                                                          
11 Equation (13) can be jointly estimated using a SUR approach across all N-locations, if N is the total number of 
locations.  Although less efficient, we estimate only the share equation at home, leaving joint estimation with 
affiliate share equations in other locations for future work. 
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where e and a represent productivity shocks, Li is the total quantity of labor used, Ki is the total quantity 
of capital used and σ ( )ω   is the Allen elasticity of substitution between labor (capital) in location i and j 
and is defined below.12  
The first-order condition with respect to labor hired in the U.S. is: 
, ,
,








and the first-order condition with respect to labor hired abroad is:  
, ,
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where p are final goods prices at home and abroad and w are wages at home and abroad. 
Since,  
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Taking logs of both sides of (20) yields the following: 
                                                          
12 If sigma is equal to zero, we have the case of perfect complements (i.e. left shoes and right shoes, the leontief 
function that looks like L=min(Lh, Lf) this is obviously extreme but might be applicable to some kinds of natural 
resource extraction where unless you have some workers abroad pumping out the oil, workers in the US cant do 
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(21) ln( / ) ln ( 1) ln lnh hh f h
f f f
p e wL L
p e w
σ σ σ= + − − . 
Equation (21) underscores the fact that as long as there is some substitution between domestic and foreign 
labor (i.e. σ >0), the cost of labor abroad plays an important role in determining the demand for U.S. 
labor.   
 
Comparing Elasticities of Labor Demand Across Specifications 
 All four approaches described above yield coefficient estimates which can be used to derive 
elasticities of factor demand η  and Allen elasticities of substitution σ .  In equation (11), the key 
parameters are the η ’s. The term ijη  is generally referred to as the elasticity of factor demand.  Typically, 
inputs i and j are referred to as p-complements if ijη  is less than zero, and p-substitutes if ijη  is greater 
than zero.  A negative cross-wage elasticity would imply that an increase in foreign wages reduces the 
demand for U.S. labor, while a positive sign indicates that U.S. and foreign labor are price substitutes.  













where jjη  is the own elasticity of labor demand in location j.   
jξ The key parameters in equation (13) are the s.  To convert these into Allen partial elasticities 
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ξ
(23) σ = +
       σ = + −  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
L=L
anything. The polar opposite is σ  tending to infinity (i.e. labor at home and labor abroad are perfect substitutes so 
h+Lf) – this is also extreme but some version of this might be realistic for production workers.  
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The Allen partial elasticity of substitution  jkσ  gives us the percentage change in the ratio of L  to Lj k with 
respect to the percentage change in the ratio of  wk to wj.  The Allen partial elasticity of substitution is 
directly estimated as the coefficient on relative wages using the CES approach (equation (21)). To convert 
e Allen partial elasticity of substitution into an elasticity of factor demand, we multiply by the factor 
share: 
tion j.  Factor shares are 
pically computed by taking the sample means of the data.13 We will report both Allen and factor price 
timation strategies in Table 6.  
irm-
ad.  In previous work, 
th
 
ln / lnij j ij i js L w(24) η = σ = ∂ ∂  
 
As defined earlier, ijη  is the elasticity of factor demand and represents the percentage change in 
employment in location i in response to a percentage change in the wage in loca
ty
elasticities of substitution for each of the four es
 
Estimation Issues and Identification Strategy 
         To estimate equations (10), (11), (13) and (21) we need data on home and foreign technology 
shocks (A’s), employment (L’s), capital (K’s), wages, and price shocks (P’s). We measure technology 
shocks with firm-level research and development (R&D) expenditures.  Wages are measured at the f
level, but since these are clearly endogeneous we instrument them using industrial wages gathered by 
UNIDO by country and year.  We measure L as the number of employees at home and abroad, and 
measure K as the net book value of property, plant, and equipment at home and abro
we also controlled for intermediate inputs by including the log of real intermediate input purchases from 
within the United States, but the results were unaffected and are not reported here. 
 In U.S. manufacturing, international competition plays an important role in price determination. 
Consequently, we proxy for U.S. demand shocks using both industry dummies and import competition 
                                                          
13 Confidence intervals can be computed using bootstrapped standard errors. 
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within and external to the firm.  We use industry-level import penetration to proxy for competition from
third party imports. These data were made available at the 4-digit ISIC level for 1977 through 1999 by 
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006).  Firms in our sample also report imports to and exports from each 
affiliate loc
 





e countries on U.S. labor market outcomes.  To account for this, we 
include  




                                                          
im f imports manufactured by affiliates and imports outside the firm’s control on domestic labor 
demand.14
 Following Desai et al (2006), we proxy for foreign price shocks with GDP growth in high- an
low-income affiliate locations. Our summary statistics and raw correlations, as well as previous work
Brainard and Riker (1997, 2001) and Bernard et al. (2006), suggest that the degree to which foreign 
employment, investment and imports affect domestic labor outcomes will depend critically on their 
location.  U.S. affiliate employment in high-income countries is likely to have very different effects tha
affiliate employment in low-incom
separate values for foreign capital, labor, R&D expenditures, imports, and demand shocks for
high- and low-income countries.   
Since U.S.-based multinationals have affiliates in multiple locations, we construct aggregate 
measures of activity abroad for affiliate activity in high- and low-income countries. Specifically, we use 
employment weighted averages of the right-hand side variables in equations (10), (11), (13) and (21) 
across affiliate country locations within each set of high- and low-income countries.  Our weights are the 
parent’s share of foreign employment in each affiliate location, using th
e ment across countries within each high or low-income set of countries.  The initial distribution of 
employment is determined by when the parent first enters the sample.  
 Estimation of (10), (11), (13) and (21) using OLS is likely to lead to biased coefficient estimates 
since capital, foreign employment, firm-specific wages, and firm-specific trade flows are simultaneou
determined with home employment.  Therefore, we also estimate equations (10), (11), (13) and (21) using 
instrumental variables (IV). Given the large number of endogenous variables, we choose to label our 
14 In previous work we also separately controlled for goods imported from the exported to the affiliate but 
manufactured by third parties, but these additional variables are excluded in the current draft because they were not 
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firm-specific proxies for technology shocks as controls and focus on the following endogenous variables: 
capital stock (at home, as well as in high- and low-income affiliates), employment (in high- and low-
income affiliates), exports to foreign affiliates and imports from foreign affiliates. Our instruments for
capital stock abroad include capital controls in the host country affiliate, the median host country tax rate
and a measure of political risk. These measures are all correlated with foreign investment in the host 
country and should only affect parent employment through their impact on investment. Our instruments 
for intra-firm trade are U.S. tariffs at the four-digit industry level, freight costs, the distance between
host and the source country, and trade agreements signed between the host country and the United State
Tariffs and freight costs are taken from Bernard et al (2006), while the distance measures and trade 
agreements were provided by Andrew Rose.  These measures are all correlated with bilateral trade but 
should be excluded from the estimating equation. Finally, instruments for employment (or firm-specific 
wages) in high- and low-income locations include the percentage of national income spent on education,
the number of PC’s per 1,000 people, and industrial wages.  The first two are taken from the World Ban











 some firms relocate all operations abroad, close 
down U
 could be downward biased.    
Following Wooldridge (2002) we model this selection problem as follows. If our equation of 
terest is given by: 
the quality of that labor, yet should only affect U.S. labor market outcomes through their impact o
choice of employment in affiliate locations.   
 In addition to problems of simultaneity bias, we also face potentially important selection 
problems. The dependent variables in our estimating equations - the log of parent employment and U.S
labor cost shares - are not observed in every time period. We are particularly concerned about attr
since the sample could exhibit “survivorship bias” if




Ttuxy ititit ,...,2, =+= β , 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
statistically significant and were collinear with imports and exports manufactured by the affiliate and parent. 
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then conditional on the parent reporting in the previous period, i.e. si,t-1 = 1, we can write a reduced form 
election equation for  as,  2≥ts
 






h parent i.  Once a series of 
mbdas have been estimated for each year and parent, the estimating equations are augmented by these 
lambdas.  For example, equation (10) would be estimated as the following: 
 
ijt
j j j h j
it is a binary selection indicator equal to one if the firm is present in the BEA database in years
and t+1. A problem arises if the error terms uit and vit are correlated.  In the context of panel data with 
unobserved firm fixed effect, attrition, and endogenous right-hand side variables, Wooldridge (2002) 
proposes as a solution a variant of a two-stage Heckman correction for selection modified for a panel 
context.   In each period, Wooldridge proposes estimating a selection equation using a probit approach 
and calculating lambda, the inverse Mills ratio, for each time period and eac
la
0 2
ˆ ˆ(1 og 2iht j ijt j ijt hj ijt j ijt t it T t it iL P A L K d dT f1') l β α β γ ω ρ λ ρ λ= + + + + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
 In the case where there are endogenous right-hand side variables, then (10’) can be estimated
using as instruments the original instrument list augmented to include the estimated lambdas.  However, 
this approach is only successful if in addition to the instruments for the endogenous right-hand side 









it which are observed b
firm exits the sample (in period t-1) and which do not belong in the estimating equation.  We have 
identified candidate variables using the insights derived from a class of models indicating that 
heterogeneity in productivity is a significant determinant of whether firms enter into international trade o
foreign investment (see Melitz (2003)).  These models suggest that selection is likely to be a fun
the plant’s level of (exogenously determined and unchanging) total factor productivity relative to
firms in the same industry.  While the theoretical framework suggests that an individual firm’s 
productivity (proxied by the increase in R&D expenditures) should be correlated with wages or 
employment, we use the level of a firm’s productivity relative to a benchmark firm in the same sect
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our excluded measure of productivity. Another determinant of survival which does not belong in the
estimating equations is parent profitability.  Consequently, we will apply t
 
he approach to selection 
utlined above, using as the two excluded determinants of survival the parent’s profitability and its 
 other firms in the industry in the previous period. 
and 
fell, 











 We begin by reporting sample means in Table 3. The share of parent expenditures on their U.S. 
labor force relative to total worldwide expenditures on employment during the sample period was 58.4 
percent.  Affiliates in high-income countries accounted for 37.1 percent of expenditures on employees 
affiliates in low-income countries accounted for the remaining 5 percent.  While the U.S. mean share 
the mean share of labor expenditures by the parent on affiliate employment increased in both low and 
high-income affiliate locations.  The means and changes in means in Table 3 are different than those 
presented in Table 1, since Table 1 weights th
means.  In addition, Table 3 only includes enterprises with non-missing observations for all the dep
and independent variables in 1982 and 1999. 
 Although labor expenditure shares show small mean changes over time in Table 3, actual 
employment fell dramatically in the U.S. and increased dramatically in low-income affiliates.  The reaso
why the employment changes were very large but expenditure share changes were not is because wage 
trends offset the employment developments: real wages in the sample went up in the United States and
high income affiliates and fell in low-income affiliate countries.  One explanation which is consistent 
these wage trends is a change in the composition of employment: U.S. parents (and their high-income 
affiliates) are retaining relatively high-skilled workers and shifting relatively low-skilled jobs to low-
income countries where labor is less expensive. We cannot easily test this hypothesis since we do not 
have detailed information on worker characteristics at the U.S. parents. 
in  at the U.S. parent but not at affiliates (see Table 3) and the decline in real wages in affiliates in 
low-income locations (see Table 1) are consistent with this possibility. 
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 Research and development expenditures at the U.S. parent were on average 3.5 percent of total 
sales; in high-income affiliates the corresponding fraction was 1.5 percent and in low-income affiliates 
research and development expenditures accounted for .9 percent of sales.   The share of R&D 
expenditures in sales nearly doubled, increasing by 2.8 percentage points between 1977 and 1999
United States, but fell in both low- and high-income affiliates.  T
 in the 
he trends are very similar if instead we 




 1977 and 1999, by an 
verage of 5.4 and 1.4 percentage points.  The increase in exports to foreign affiliates reflects more than a 





p chnology with research and development employment as a percentage of total employment. The
rising share of R&D expenditures in sales for U.S. manufacturers is consistent with skill-biased 
technological change and rising average manufacturing wages. 
 Exports to foreign affiliates from the U.S. parent accounted on average for 4.1 percent of sales
and imports to the U.S. parent from the foreign affiliate accounted for an average 2.9 percent of sales.  
Average import penetration in the four-digit SIC sector over the period across all of manufacturing w
13.4 percent.  Import penetration increased by 12.5 percentage points between 1977 and 1999, which 
reflects an enormous increase in the U.S. exposure of manufacturing to import competition.  Exports t
and imports from foreign affiliates as a share of sales also increased between
a
doubling of intra-firm trade.  To the extent that exp
processing, this trend provides evidence of increasing outsourcing activity. 
 
Fixed Effect and IV Results for Labor Demand  
 We cannot estimate equation (10’) without estimates of the inverse mills ratios – our λs in 
equation (10’). Thus, we begin by reporting in Table 4 the results of the probit selection equations for 
each of the years 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999. The probits for each of the years identify the determinants 
of survival based on determinants from the previous period in which data was collected. For example
column (1), the coefficients tell us the marginal impact of different variables in 1977 on remaining in the
dataset in 1982. For efficiency, we include all the instruments used in the second stage to predict affili
employment and wages, in addition to two variables that are only included in the selection equati
profitability and total factor productivity.  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of net income to sales.  
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Total factor productivity is (TFP) calculated as the average residual across all years from subtract
share-weighted factor inputs from output.  Factor inputs include employment, capital stock, and 
intermediate inputs.  Total Factor Productivity is normalized by the highest TFP level within that three-
digit industry. The results show that high TFP (relative to the industry) and high profitability are 
significant predictors of continuing in the BEA sample.  Profitability is a significant predictor of survi
in all years, while TFP is a significant predictor of survival in 1982.  A number of other variables also 
significantly affect the probability of survival.  Firms are more likely to survive if they operate in affiliate 
locations with higher educational expenditures and higher GDP per capita.  While R and D spending 
significantly (positively) affects survival in high income locations, it has no significant impact on su
in low income locations. Import penetration in the U.S. is significantly and negatively associated with
probability of survival, while U.S. tariffs on imports are positively associated with survival.  U.S. parents 










that a 10 percent increase in affiliate employment in high-income countries is associated with a 1.9 
consistent with the negative impact of import competition and the positive effect of tariff protection.  
Other factors associated with the business climate in the affiliate location, including political risk, ca
controls, and the tax rate, do not significantly affect the U.S. parent’s probability of survival. 
 We report the results of estimating (10’) in Table 5. The log of U.S. employment is our dependent 
variable and we use a within transformation of the data to eliminate the firm fixed effect.  The first 
column of Table 5 reports the coefficient on foreign affiliate employment, aggregated across all location
in an OLS regression of log U.S. parent employment on log affiliate employment. The point estimate of 
.151 indicates that a 10 percent increase in foreign employment would lead to a 1.51 percent increase in 
U.S. parent employment. The next two columns show that this result is very sensitive to the loca
the affiliate and to the addition of other controls. If we decompose affiliate employment into high and low
income regions, column (2) shows that the coefficient on high-income affiliate employment is .192 while 
the coefficient on low-income affiliate employment is significant and negative at -.02.    These 
coefficients suggest that employment in high-income affiliates is complementary with U.S. employment 
but that employment in low-income affiliate’s substitutes for U.S. employment. The point estimates imply 
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percent increase in U.S. employment, while a 10 percent increase in affiliate employment in low-incom
countries is associated with a .2 percent fall in U.
e 











fell while low-income affiliate employment increased, the point estimates in column (2) are consistent
with employment declines in the United States.  
 In column (3) we separate affiliate employment into non-production workers and production 
workers, which roughly corresponds to skilled and unskilled labor.   The point estimates for both skilled 
and unskilled workers continue to be positive and significantly correlated with U.S. employment for
income affiliates, and are not significantly different from each other.  However, for low-income affiliates
the point estimate is statistically insignificant for non-production workers in affiliates based in low-
income countries and is equal to -.042 and statistically significant for production workers in th
affiliates. This suggests that substitution is occurring through the use of production (unskilled) workers, 
as jobs are being shifted from U.S. workers to production workers in low-income countries.  
 The next two columns of Table 5 explore the impact of controlling for selection by including the 
inverse Mills ratio computed separately for each year. We also add variables to control for technolo
change (R&D expenditures in each location as a share of total sales in each location), the capital stock in 
each location, GDP per capita in purchasing power parity dollars in high-income and low-income 
locations (to control for demand shocks abroad), import penetration into the U.S. (to control for de
shocks in the U.S.), and exports to (imports from) affiliates. The sample size decreases significantly
implementing the selection correction eliminates the first time series observation for each parent. 
 Although a joint F-test for the inclusion of the selection terms is statistically significant, a 
comparison of the coefficients reported in columns (4) and (5) suggests that correcting for selectio
not significantly affect the results.  Adding the inverse Mills ratio to control for selection out of the 
sample does not change the sign and barely changes the point estimates on the coefficients.  The 
coefficient on low-income affiliate employment remains negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that employment in low-income countries by U.S. multinationals substitutes for home employment.   T
point estimate is -.037 with correction for attrition and -.040 without the correction, indicating that a 10 
percent increase in employment in low income affiliates by U.S. parents would reduce employment at 
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home by .4 percent. The coefficient on employment in high income affiliates is .110 with the co
and .114 without, indicating that a 10 percent increase in high income affiliate employment would be 
associated with a 1.1 percent increase in U.S. employment.  Since the coefficients on th
rrection 
e other 




 a strong 
ith affiliate location.  While 
me 
independent variables are similarly unaffected and we lose more than 50 percent of the sample when we 
correct for attrition, in the remainder of the paper we do not control for attrition bias.   
 Column (6) presents the results with the addition of all the right-hand side variables, but without 
the selection correction. Although the negative impact of affiliate employment in low-income countries 
on U.S. employment in manufacturing is significant (suggesting that a 10 percent increase in low income 
affiliate employment is associated with a .2 percent employment contraction at home), the resul
5 indicate that other factors played an equally important role in determining employment at the firm level.  
In column (6), a 10 percent increase in the capital stock at home increases U.S. manuf
e ent by 5.6 percent.  Conversely, a 10 percent increase in the capital stock in high- or low-i
affiliates is associated with a U.S. employment decline of between .1 and .4 percent.. 
 Increases in trade, both arms length and between the U.S. parent and its affiliates, are also 
associated with U.S. manufacturing employment declines.  The over 10 percentage point increase in 
import penetration reported in Table 3 implies a decline in U.S. manufacturing employment of 1
percent.  Even larger negative effects on U.S. employment are associated with intra-firm trade.  A 10 
percentage point increase in imports from (exports to) the foreign affiliate is associated with an 
employment decline of 10.6 percentage points (for exports, 4 percentage points).  The IV estimates in 
column (5) suggest a much larger negative impact. While an employment decline associated with 
increasing exports from the U.S. parent to its foreign affiliate seems puzzling, the data shows
positive correlation between exports to foreign affiliates and exports to foreign affiliates for further 
processing, suggesting that U.S. exports to foreign affiliates reflect increased outsourcing of 
manufacturing activity, rather than increased sales.  Foreign demand shocks are also associated with 
significant effects on U.S. employment, although the effects again vary w
positive foreign demand shocks are associated with a positive impact on U.S. employment in high inco
affiliate locations, the opposite is true for low income affiliate locations. 
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 Big negative effects are also associated with our proxy for technological change, the share of 
research and development expenditures in sales.  The results in column (6) of Table 5 indicate that a ten
percentage point increase in the U.S. R&D expenditure share in sales would be associated with a
percentage point decline in total parent employment.  Although parent R&D employment increased b




lying a reduction in home 
mploy
ent in 




ate is in a 
loyment increased by forty percent between 1977 
e ment of 2 percent), the coefficient estimates suggest that technological change as a source of 
falling manufacturing employment could be important in the future. 
 Before turning to the instrumental variable (IV) estimates in column (7) of Table 5, we discuss 
the first-stage estimates for the IV regression.  Table 7 reports the first-stage results for employm
high- and low-income affiliates, and capital stock in all three locations.  We also report the first-stage F-
statistics.  The first-stage results show that the first-stage F-statistic is sufficiently large that our 
instruments have enough power to explain the endogenous variables.  The only possible e
the parent-specific imports from affiliates.  For parent imports from affiliates, the instruments are 
somewhat weaker but still exceed the threshold indicating a weak instrument problem.   
 Column (7) of Table 5 reports the results of instrumental variable estimation, using the instrument
list described above.  The over-identification test suggests that we cannot reject that the instruments 
valid.  The IV correction inflates the negative coefficient on employment in low-income affiliates, which 
is consistent with measurement error biasing towards zero the within estimates or simultaneity bias 
leading to coefficient estimates which are too positive.  Consistent with simultaneity bias or measurement 
error, the coefficients in column (7) on affiliate employment become more negative in low-income 
affiliates relative to the OLS estimates.  In column (7), the IV estimates indicate that a 10 percent increa
in foreign affiliate employment is associated with a .1 percent employment increase in the U.S. if the 
affiliate is in a high-income country and a 3.8 percent decline in U.S. employment if the affili
low-income country.  Since low-income affiliate emp
and 1999 (see Table 1) and high-income affiliate employment fell, this implies a fall in U.S. 
manufacturing employment of 16 percentage points. 
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 Column (8) includes the breakdown for production and non-production worker employment in 
low- and high-income affiliates.  The results are quite similar: employment in the U.S. is complementary 
with the use of both production and non-production workers in high-income affiliates but substitutable 
ith the use of production labor (unskilled labor) in low-income countries.  Since the results suggest that 




age point fall in low-income affiliate wages is associated 
 
1) 
other, suggesting that affiliate employment in high-income locations is complementary with U.S. 
w
the coefficients vary primar
the paper we concentrate on separating effects through location and not by skill category.   
 
Alternative Specifications 
  We begin by estimating equation (11), which replaces employment in affiliates as an 
independent variable with wages in low- and high-income affiliates.  The coefficient estimates are 
reported in Appendix Table A.4 and the elasticities of factor demand and Allen elasticities of substitution 
are reported in the second column of Table 6.  The firm-specific log wages were instrumented with 
UNIDO industrial wages, which were calculated as the weighted average of affiliate wages, with
weights given by initial parent or affiliate employment across locations.  The coefficient on high-inco
affiliate wages is negative and significant, suggesting that high-income affiliate employment and U.S. 
parent employment are complements: when wages in high-income affiliates increase, this hurts 
employment at home.  The IV estimate, at -.844, suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in high-
income affiliate wages is associated with a .84 percentage point decline in U.S. employment.  Howev
the positive coefficient on wages in low-income affiliates suggests that employment there acts as a 
substitute for employment at home: a 10 percent
with a .2 to .9 percentage point reduction in U.S. employment.  The own wage elasticity of demand, 
which is between -0.41 (IV) and -0.48 (OLS), is consistent with previous studies of U.S. labor demand
surveyed by Hamermesh (1993).    
 The implied labor demand elasticities and elasticities of substitution for equations (10) and (1
can be compared in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.  The η’s and σ’s are broadly consistent with each 
manufacturing employment, while affiliate employment in low-income locations substitutes for U.S. 
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15employment.   The elasticity of labor demand varies from .02 to .09 for low income affiliates, suggesting 
that increasing low income affiliate wages boost U.S. employment.  The elasticity varies between -.03 an
-.84 for high income affiliat
d 
es, suggesting that increasing wages in high income affiliates dampens U.S. 
d in the first column of Table 
ble 6.  
labor demand for parents.  
 An alternative approach adopted by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card (2001) involves 
estimating equation (21).  Their approach allows us to directly infer the Allen elasticity of substitution σ 
from the coefficient on relative wages.  As indicated in Appendix Table A.5, the implied Allen elasticity 
of substitution is positive for low income affiliates and negative for high income affiliates, corroborating 
previous results showing that labor in low income regions substitutes for parent employment.  Failure to 
separate estimates by location of affiliates  (reported in the first two rows of Appendix Table A.5) yields 
the result that employment at home and abroad is complementary, as reporte
5 which pools affiliate employment across high and low income regions..    
 The implied elasticities σ and η are compared with previous approaches in column (3) of Ta
The magnitudes are remarkably consistent with the first two columns, yielding a price elasticity of 
demand ijη which varies between .02 and .03 in low income affiliates and -.2 and -.4 in high income 
affiliates.   Recall that a negative elasticity ijη  would imply that an increase in foreign wages reduces the
demand for U.S. labor, while a positive sign indicates that U.S. and foreign labor are price substitutes.  
Confirming the earlier results, in high income affiliates labor is a com
 
plement to U.S. labor, while in low 
igh and 
income affiliates U.S. and foreign labor are substitutes. 
    While the first three approaches yield remarkably consistent results, the cost share approach 
reveals somewhat different estimates for the high income affiliates, suggesting that labor in both h
low income locations substitutes for U.S. labor.  We report results of estimating equation (13) in 
                                                          
15 Using a similar approach but focusing only on the overseas affiliates of US parents, Brainard and Riker (1997) 
find that US affiliates in low income countries are complementary with affiliates in high income countries, while 
affiliates located in similar regions act as substitutes. Brainard and Riker suggest that this is evidence of vertical 
relationships between affiliates in high and low income regions, while affiliates from similar regions compete with 
each other.  We find the opposite: US parent employment is complementary with employment in high income 
regions but substitutable with employment in low income regions.  One area we leave for further research is to 
reproduce the results in Table 5 and Appendix Table A.4 for affiliates in high and low income locations.  It is 
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Appendix Table A.6 and the implied elasticities in column (4) of Table 6.   The coefficients on f
shares imply that foreign labor substitutes for home labor in both high- and low-income affiliate locati
The magnitudes for the low income affiliates are consistent with the results from the first three 
approaches and remarkably similar to those derived by Muendler et al (2006) and Brainard and Riker 
(2001): a 10 percentage point decline in foreign wages would be associated with a .4 percent fall in U.S. 
employment.  For high income affiliates, the translog cost function approach also implies substitutabili
between U.S. and foreign labor:  a 10 percentage point decline in high income wages would be associated 
with a 3 percent fall in U.S. employment.  As expected, the own price elasticity is negative.  Both th












nt wages have increased. Thus, it is not clear what a share 
translog cost function approach will lead researchers to conclude that foreign affiliate employment 
substitutes for home employment across all locations.   
 The estimated own price elasticity of demand in the translog approach is also consistent w
previous studies on labor demand.  The own price elasticity of demand varies between -.3 and -.5 and is 
precisely what we would have expected from previous work on labor demand and Hamermesh’s 
assessment of the literature.  He suggests a plausible range between -.1 and -.75, with his best guess at -
However, we should point out that the common assumption that the capital stock is fixed in the short-ru
is not appropriate in our case since we are looking at five year intervals. Indeed, changes in the cap
stock and changes in trade are associated with significant effects on the cost share, suggesting that the 
more general approaches reported in columns (1) through (3) in Table 6 are more appropriate. An 
additional concern has to do with the measurement of wages. The numbers in Table 1 are consistent with
a shift in the composition of the labor force in U.S. manufacturing away from “production” workers –
parent employment has gone down while pare
dependent variable is measuring and with the current BEA data, we cannot figure this out since U.S. 
wages are not broken down by skill level.16   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conceivable that affiliates in similar regions act as substitutes, but that only activities in high income regions are 
complementary with US parent employment.     
16 The 1982 benchmark survey did include this information and the 2004 survey includes occupational codes. 
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  As a final cross-check on these conclusions, we turn to a pure reduced-form approach.  It can be
shown that all the endogenous variables in our system of equations could be made a function of the 
exogenous variables and the instruments in our framework.  The resulting estimating equation for 












would reduce the parent capital stock by 1 percent.  Arm’s length trade, proxied by import penetration 
and abroad, and the instruments. This is essentially the first-stage in our instrumental variable estimation.  
We report all these results, along with the other first-stage estimates, in Table 7.  For purposes of 
comparison, we also report the key elasticities derived from Table 7 in the final column of Table 6. 
 Of primary interest are the reduced form regressions with the log of U.S. employment and the log
of the U.S. capital stock as the dependent variables, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7.  T
results for the log of U.S. employment are consistent with the translog specification, with a positive 
coefficient on both wages in high and low income affiliates.  The results imply that lower wa
reduce U.S. employment, suggesting that U.S. employment and foreign affiliate employment are 
substitutes.  The magnitudes are small, suggesting that a 10 percentage point wage reduction in affiliat
locations would be associated with an employment increase in the U.S. of .1 to .7 percent.    
 Other factors play an important role.  R and D expenditures are associated with a reduction 
domestic U.S. manufacturing employment, as is import penetration from low-income countries.  The 
magnitudes suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of R and D in sales is associated with
.7 percentage point reduction in U.S. manufacturing employment.  The creation of a free trade area 
between the United States and the country of the foreign affiliate is associated with a 7 p
in U.S. parent employment.  Conversely, higher U.S. tariffs on imports are significantly and positively 
associated with U.S. parent employment.  The magnitudes are large: a 1 percentage point increase in U.S
tariffs is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in manufacturing employment. 
 Although U.S. parent employment responds significantly to offshore employment expansion, the 
impact of offshoring on the domestic (parent) capital stock is even greater.  This is an effect which has 
been overlooked in previous analyses of offshoring on U.S. parent activity.  Higher wages in affiliate 
locations have a large impact on the U.S. capital stock: a 10 percent fall in wages in high income affiliates 
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and penetration from low-income countries, significantly and negatively affects the parent capital stock
The signing of a free trade area with the U.S. is associated with a 22.4 percent decline in the parent capi
stock, suggesting that the focus of concern should shift from employment to investment.  Higher U.S. 
tariffs conversely are associated with an increase in the parent capital stock; the point estimate implies 
that a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. tariffs is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in the 
domestic capital stock.  While prev
. 
tal 
ious studies have emphasized the employment effects of international 
ompeti
es 
n U.S. em nt.  
the price elasticity of demand of .03 derived from the CES approach.  Recalling that  
c tion, the results in column (2) suggest that studies should be focusing on the much larger impact 
on US manufacturing investment. 
 One result is consistent across all specifications: employment in low-income affiliates substitut
for U.S. employment.  This outcome is robust to whichever framework we choose, although the 
magnitudes vary.  It is important to emphasize that our basic specification (Table 5) provides the most 
conservative estimates of the negative impact of a fall in low-income affiliate wages o ployme
All the other specifications (see Table 6, rows 2 and 3) suggest much larger effects.  Take, for example, 
ij ij jjη γ η=   and 
using the value of -.073 from the reduced form estimates in Table 7 for jjη in low income affiliates yields 
an elasticity of -.410 for the implied response of domestic U.S. employment to low-income affiliate 
employment (the ijγ ’s reported in Table 5).  This suggests that for every percentage point increase in low 
income affiliate employment, U.S. parents reduce their domestic workforce by .41 percent.   Doing the 




employment; these declines are at least as significant as the impact of expanding foreign employment.  
im  that a 1 percentage point increase in foreign affiliate employment would lead to a reduction in 
home parent employment of .6 percent. 
 The evidence also suggests that other aspects of globalization have played a significant role in 
accounting for the downsizing of the U.S. manufacturing sector.  One factor that has not received
attention in previous literature is the impact of U.S. multinationals expanding physical investment abroa
Increases in the capital stock in foreign affiliates are associated with significant declines in U.S. 
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All the approaches show that both arms length trade, as captured by U.S. import penetration, 
fi
and intra-
rm trade have also played an important role in reducing U.S. manufacturing employment.  




 in low 
rtant than the increasing expansion of the affiliate capital stock and 
e to 




 We summarize the effects of offshoring, trade, and technical change on U.S. manufacturing 
employment in Table 8.  We combine the OLS and IV coefficient estimates presented in Table 5 with the 
actual aggregate changes in employment, investment, trade, R&D intensity, and GDP per capita changes 
across affiliate locations taken from Table 1.  Focusing on the last column in Table 8, which combines the 
instrumental variable estimates from Table 5 with actual mean changes in the BEA sample between 1977 
and 1999, we see that the major determinants of contraction in U.S. manufacturing parent employment a
(1) increasing employment in low income affiliates (2) a corresponding increase in physical investment 
abroad and (3) increasing trade between the U.S. parent and its affiliates.  Increasing employment 
income affiliates accounts for a 15 percentage point drop in parent employment, while increas
investment in low and high income affiliates accounts for 34 and 6 percent of the drop in US 
manufacturing employment.  Intra-firm trade is associated with nearly a fifty percent drop in 
manufacturing employment.  These figures suggest that substituting parent employment for  labor
income countries is less impo
increasing intra-firm trade.   
 One final possibility is that hiring workers in low income countries, while associated with 
contraction in the U.S., prevents the parent from shutting down operations. Borjas, Freeman and Katz 
(1997) study the counterfactual by asking what would have happened to low wage workers if imports 
from developing countries had been instead produced by U.S. firms. In a similar spirit, we would lik
know what might have happened to U.S. workers if the parent had not hired workers in developing 
countries. It is impractical for us to try to estimate the parent cost of production and ultimately the 
demand for its products if the firm had used higher wage workers than their foreign counterparts. Instead, 
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 In Table 9, we report the results of this analysis. We begin with a simple regression of our 
survival indicator on the percentage of employees a firm hires in developing countries in period t-1. We 
see in column (1) that a 1 percent increase in the number of employees hired in developing countries 
increases the parent probability of survival by 0.16 percent. In column (2) we augment the regression with 
firm size measured as the log of the parents’ total capital stock. The magnitude of the coefficient on 
percent employees in developing countries drops dramatically as does its statistical significance. This is 
not surprising since firm size and percent employees in developing countries are highly correlated. In 
column (3) we include all of the controls used to determine the probability of survival in Table 4 – again 
the coefficient on percent employees in developing countries is small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant.  
 Because the firm size effect swamps the effect of percent employment in developing countries 
and because we know that it is primarily large firms that hire workers in developing countries, we turn in 
column (4) to an analysis of large firms. We define large firms as firms with more than 20,000 employees 
in the U.S., which amounts to roughly 15% of our sample. The results in column (4) indicate that among 
large firms hiring workers in low-income countries does increase the probability of survival.  
  
VI. Concluding Comments 
 
 This paper measures the impact of different forms of globalization on manufacturing employment 
by U.S. multinationals in the United States. Over the period 1977 to 1999 multinational manufacturing 
firms shed more than 4 million jobs in the United States. Over this same period, the number of workers 
hired by affiliates in developing countries increased while wages paid to these workers declined. These 
facts are consistent with the notion that U.S. parents are exporting low-wage jobs to low-income 
countries. However, the expansion in manufacturing employment in developing countries amounts to 
only one quarter of the jobs lost at home. In this paper, we show that other factors--including 
technological change, expanding US investment abroad, and international trade--are important 
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determinants of U.S. manufacturing employment. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that job 
losses might have been greater in the absence of offshoring. 
 We present a general approach to measuring the impact of globalization on U.S. manufacturing 
employment. Our approach takes into account the simultaneity between a firm’s employment decision in 
the U.S. and its foreign affiliates.  To solve the endogeneity problem, we develop a series of first-stage 
regressions that explain U.S. multinational expansion at home and abroad as a function of predetermined 
factors such as free trade agreements, educational expenditures in destination countries, and restrictions 
on capital repatriation.  We address the problem of attrition in the sample by using a two-stage Heckman 
approach and modeling survival as a function of the productivity and profitability of the U.S. parent. 
 We apply our framework to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on U.S. multinational 
enterprises to identify the determinants of job losses in U.S. manufacturing.  We find that across all 
specifications, employment in low-income affiliates substitutes for U.S. employment.   However, the 
effect is not large: our point estimates suggest that the 40 percentage point increase in low income 
affiliate employment of US multinationals between 1977 and 1999 only accounted for a drop in U.S. 
domestic manufacturing employment of 15 percent. 
 Other aspects of globalization have probably played a more important role in affecting parent 
manufacturing employment. These include an increase in physical investment abroad, and trade between 
the U.S. parent and its affiliates.  In other words, offshoring affects U.S. manufacturing employment 
primarily by expanding the foreign affiliate capital stock and increasing intra-firm trade.  Nevertheless, it 
is clear that adding another worker in low income affiliate locations reduces employment at home, 
contradicting the claims made by Mankiw and Swagel (2006) regarding the job-creating effects of 
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TABLE 1 
TRENDS OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS IN MANUFACTURING 1977-1999 
      
Variable 1977 1982 1989 1994 1999 
Number of Parents 1746 1183 1230 1221 785 
Affiliate Share of Jobs 28.33% 26.57% 31.43% 33.91% 35.62% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 20.09% 18.43% 21.59% 22.78% 20.98% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 8.22% 8.11% 9.84% 11.08% 14.64% 
Affiliate Share of Compensation 18.97% 17.56% 22.96% 25.61% 24.17% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share  16.35% 14.44% 20.15% 21.95% 19.27% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share   2.59% 3.09% 2.80% 3.63% 4.89% 
Affiliate Share of Total Investment 25.99% 23.29% 25.14% 29.08% 29.10% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share  20.12% 17.29% 20.95% 23.72% 20.88% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share  
rents
5.67% 5.80% 4.17% 5.33% 8.22% 
Pa       
Total Employment 11017 9771 9137 6893 7181 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 31.34 31.82 33.25 36.67 37.87 
Capital Stock (Net PPE) 389 369 343 282 306 
R&D Spending (% Sales) 1.39% 2.81% 3.38% 3.93% 5.08% 
Exports to Foreign Affiliates (% Sales) 1.85% 3.66% 5.41% 6.93% 7.35% 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (% Sales) 2.95% 2.90% 4.39% 5.84% 7.11% 
Developed Country Affiliates: All      
Total Employment 3089 2753 2876 2376 2531 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 21 21 27 31 27 
Capital Stock (Net PPE) 99.21 118.34 145.11 138.21 151.63 
Developing Country Affiliates: All      
Total Employment 1263 1079 1311 1156 1766 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 11 10 9 9 8 
Capital Stock (Net PPE) 20.71 32.89 27.66 32.24 60.76 
Macro Trends in Countries of Operations      
GDP per capita in High-Income Countries 5076 7728 14320 17628 18773 
GDP per capita in Low-Income Countries 1250 1678 2217 3117 2938 
U.S. Import Penetration  7.91% 9.93% 16.24% 19.73% 21.95% 
U.S. Import Penetration with some products from Low 34.99% 44.51% 55.14% 58.57% 59.77% 
Wage Countries 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Note:  Data is for manufacturing parents and their manufacturing affiliates 
with non-missing observations for labor's share of income and positive employment. Multiple affiliates in one country 
are treated as one affiliate. Weighted by employment shares, where applicable.  Real total compensation are in '000 of 
82-84 U.S. dollars; capital stock are in '000,000 of 82-84 U.S. dollars.  Data on GDP per capita are from the World 
Bank, data on import penetration are from Peter Schott’s website. 
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TABLE 2 
TRENDS OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS IN SERVICES 1977- 1999 
Variable 1977 1982 1989 1994 1999 
Number of Parents 58 76 112 133 242 
Number of Countries in which Parents Have Affiliates 6.74 4.12 4.92 6.97 11.62 
Developed Countries 5.19 3.10 4.27 5.64 7.61 
Developing Countries 1.56 1.02 0.65 1.33 3.94 
Affiliate Share of Jobs 15.43% 9.21% 16.93% 19.13% 25.09% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 11.67% 7.09% 15.36% 16.22% 19.41% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Jobs 3.76% 2.12% 1.57% 2.91% 5.67% 
Affiliate Share of Compensation 13.41% 7.25% 14.99% 17.30% 21.75% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 11.20% 6.06% 14.45% 16.38% 19.29% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Compensation 2.21% 1.19% 0.54% 0.92% 2.46% 
Affiliate Share of Total Investment 13.97% 6.76% 17.65% 21.60% 23.17% 
Developed Country Affiliate Share of Investment 11.88% 5.79% 17.06% 20.15% 19.47% 
Developing Country Affiliate Share of Investment 
 2.09% 0.96% 0.59% 1.45% 3.70% 
Parents      
Total Employment 532 867 1377 1658 4795 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 19.55 18.82 20.78 20.22 24.91 
Developed Country Affiliates: All      
Total Employment 73 68 255 333 1243 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 19.17 18.12 18.79 19.54 21.06 
Developing Country Affiliates: All      
Total Employment 24 20 26 60 363 
Real Total Compensation (per worker) 13.18 11.32 8.16 6.49 10.37 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis.  Note:  Data is for parents and their affiliates with non-missing observations for labor's share of 
income and positive employment. Multiple affiliates in one country are treated as one affiliate. Weighted by employment shares, where 













U.S. (domestic) Share in Labor Expenditures across all locations 3368 0.584 (0.323) -0.082 -0.077 
High-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures 3368 0.371 (0.293) 0.070 0.065 
Low-Income Affiliate Share in Labor Expenditures 3368 0.050 (0.096) 0.015 0.015 
Log U.S. Employment 3368 7.762 (1.663) -0.062 -0.155 
Log High-Income Affiliate Employment 3368 5.895 (2.250) -0.319 -0.421 
Log Low-Income Affiliate Employment 3368 2.872 (3.476) 1.479 1.586 
Log U.S. Capital Stock 3368 10.897 (2.098) 0.806 0.833 
Log High-Income Affiliate Capital Stock 3368 8.633 (2.949) 0.782 0.712 
Log Low-Income Affiliate Capital Stock 3368 4.099 (4.787) 1.163 1.592 
U.S R&D Spending (% in Sales) 3368 0.035 (0.018) 0.019 0.028 
High-Income Affiliate R&D Spending (% in Sales) 3368 0.015 (0.013) -0.001 -0.016 
Low-Income Affiliate R&D Spending (% in Sales) 3368 0.009 (0.005) -0.002 -0.009 
Import Penetration, Schott 3368 0.134 (0.099) 0.108 0.125 
Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries, Schott 3368 0.441 (0.215) 0.191 0.310 
Exports to Foreign Affiliates (share in sales) 3368 0.041 (0.067) 0.008 0.054 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (share in sales) 3368 0.029 (0.063) 0.019 0.014 
Log GDP p.c. PPP in High-Income Affiliates 3368 8.503 (2.448) 1.321 1.983 
Log GDP p.c. PPP in Low-Income Affiliates 3368 2.631 (3.437) 0.198 0.171 
TFP firm - TFP max by Industry 3368 -0.212 (0.228) 0.153 0.082 
Profit Margin 3368 0.053 (0.065) 0.018 0.022 
Capital Controls (1 if controls, 0 otherwise), IMF 3368 0.359 (0.396) -0.182 -0.694 
Government Spending on Education as Share of GNI, WDI 3368 4.428 (2.014) -0.140 -0.131 
Country Tax Rate 3368 0.297 (0.127) -0.189 -0.224 
Free Trade Area (1 if U.S. has trade agreement with country), Rose 3368 0.542 (0.378) 0.285 0.352 
Distance (Miles Between Source and Host), WDI 3368 2227 (1334) -100.5 -40.33 
U.S. Tariffs on Imports, Schott  3368 0.030 (0.019) -0.025 -0.035 
Freight Costs to U.S., Schott 3368 0.049 (0.031) -0.008 -0.026 
Political Risk (Ranges from 0-6 with 6 being the least risky), ICRG 3368 4.613 (2.860) -0.252 -0.308 
Number of PCs per 1000 people, WDI 3368 109.3 (98.22) 238.1 243.6 
Industrial Wages in High Income Countries, UNIDO 3368 9.026 (0.681) -0.041 0.154 
Industrial Wages in Low Income Countries,  UNIDO 3368 6.731 (1.271) -.0611 -0.704 
Industrial Wages in the United States, UNIDO 3368 9.725 (0.071) 0.188 0.121 
Unless indicated, variables are computed using the BEA benchmark surveys of direct investment abroad for the years 1977, 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999. 
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TABLE 4 
YEAR-BY-YEAR PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL 
MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED ONLY  
 1982 1989 1994 1999 All Years 
Pooled 
Together 
0.282 0.013 0.105 0.029 0.054 Total Factor Productivity of Parent 
(0.110) (0.084) (0.131) (0.081) (0.025) 
Profit Margin of Parent 1.166 1.344 1.244 0.972 1.200 
(0.318) (0.357) (0.269) (0.259) (0.148) 
Education Expenditures (% GNI) 0.050 0.009 0.015 0.046 0.028 
(0.013) (0.024) (0.029) (0.036) (0.008) 
Log GDP p.c. High-Income Countries 0.033 0.011 0.007 0.021 0.021 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) 
Log GDP p.c. Low-Income Countries 0.019 0.014 0.002 0.037 0.019 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
R&D Spending (% Sales) 0.149 0.595 0.415 0.343 0.189 
(0.161) (0.455) (0.282) (0.194) (0.104) 
R&D Spending in High-Income 
Countries (% Sales) 
0.418 0.150 0.321 1.294 0.458 
(0.207) (0.272) (0.589) (0.690) (0.161) 
R&D Spending in Low-Income 
Countries (% Sales) 
0.560 -1.513 4.377 -0.823 0.230 
(0.404) (1.120) (3.063) (0.786) (0.279) 
Import Penetration -0.564 -0.360 -0.324 -0.130 -0.171 
(0.393) (0.427) (0.149) (0.072) (0.042) 
Import Penetration from Low-Wage 
Countries 
-0.057 -0.035 -0.267 -0.055 -0.081 
(0.133) (0.156) (0.181) (0.173) (0.074) 
Median Country Tax Rate 0.308 0.045 0.294 0.168 0.203 
(0.204) (0.043) (0.179) (0.185) (0.171) 
Capital Controls 0.052 0.010 -0.025 0.098 0.020 
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.150) (0.035) 
Distance Between Source and Host 0.017 0.024 0.019 -0.021 -0.010 
(0.027) (0.045) (0.025) (0.021) (0.011) 
Free Trade Area with the U.S. 0.048 -0.089 -0.215 -0.114 -0.115 
(0.096) (0.170) (0.073) (0.059) (0.042) 
U.S. Tariffs on Imports 0.770 3.772 -0.213 -0.129 0.803 
(0.176) (1.903) (1.829) (1.669) (0.312) 
Freight Costs to the U.S. -0.268 -0.956 -1.935 -0.439 -0.380 
(0.157) (1.636) (1.423) (0.764) (0.192) 
Political Risk 0.000 -0.010 0.018 -0.023 0.003 
(0.000) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) 
Number of PCs per 1,000 people 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
Observations 1106 724 888 859 3584 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients reported are marginal probabilities computed at the mean of 
the regressors. Probability of survival reflects the likelihood that a firm survived between the previous period 
(five years ago) and the current period.  Last column, which pools all years, includes time dummies whose 


















WITHIN ESTIMATES OF LABOR DEMAND BY U.S. PARENTS 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE FE/IV FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.151        Log Total Affiliate Employment 
(0.010)        
 0.192  .110 .114 0.102 -0.011  Log Affiliate Employment in High-Income 
Countries  (0.015)  (.015) (.019) (0.010) (0.199)  
 -0.020  -.037 -.040 -0.022 -0.379  Log Affiliate Employment in Low-Income 
Countries  (0.006)  (.013) (.013) (0.006) (0.105)  
  0.068     0.032 Log Non-Production Worker Employment in High-
Income Countries   (0.012)     (0.006) 
  0.042     0.021 Log Production Worker Employment in High-
Income Countries   (0.010)     (0.005) 
  0.010     -0.003 Log Non-Production Worker Employment in Low 
Income Countries   (0.009)     (0.005) 
  -0.042     -0.015 Log Production Worker Employment in Low-
Income Countries   (0.009)     (0.005) 
   .575 .573 0.561 0.116 0.561 Log U.S. Capital Stock 
   (.024) (.024) (0.011) (0.356) (0.011) 
   -.056 -.062 -0.036 0.108 -0.012 Log Affiliate Capital Stock in High-Income 
Countries    (.006) (.015) (0.008) (0.158) (0.007) 
   -.031 -.032 -0.011 -0.177 -0.005 Log Affiliate Capital Stock in Low-Income 
Countries    (.009) (.009) (0.004) (0.076) (0.003) 
   -.176 -.161 -0.531 -0.518 -0.547 R&D Spending (% Sales)  
   (.086) (.066) (0.068) (0.202) (0.069) 
   .033 .055 0.175 -0.059 -0.047 R&D Spending in High-Income Countries (% 
Sales)    (.269) (.271) (0.093) (0.326) (0.094) 
   -.106 -.046 -0.404 -0.364 -0.456 R&D Spending in Low-Income Countries (% 
Sales)    (.933) (.939) (0.129) (0.316) (0.130) 
   -.033 -.126 0.203 0.429 0.201 Import Penetration by Sector and Year 
   (.198) (.199) (0.095) (0.461) (0.095) 
   -.016 -.062 0.090 -0.108 0.085 Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries by 
Sector and Year    (.102) (.102) (0.047) (0.182) (0.047) 
   .005 .004 0.023 0.045 0.023 Log GDP per capita in High-Income Countries 
(ppp)    (.002) (.003) (0.004) (0.021) (0.004) 
   -.004 -.004 -0.009 -0.090 -0.006 Log GDP per capita in Low-Income Countries 
(ppp)    (.010) (.010) (0.004) (0.055) (0.004) 
   -.571 -.659 -0.400 -5.224 -0.345 Exports to Foreign Affiliates (Share in Sales) 
   (.309) (.308) (0.126) (3.692) (0.127) 
   -.727 -.756 -1.064 -4.370 -1.162 Imports from Foreign Affiliates (Share in Sales) 
   (.383) (.321) (0.143) (3.175) (0.144) 
Selection Controls No No No Yes No No No No 
F-stat Lambdas    0.000     
Sargan Test       0.442  
Observations 3368 3368 3368 1445 1445 3368 3368 3368 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.14 .868 .867 0.58 0.23 0.57 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The “F-stat Lambdas” reports the p-value of the joint significance of the controls for selection. The Sargan Test reports the p-value of Sargan's 
(1958) test of over-identifying restrictions. It is a test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. The reported p-value indicates the level of confidence with which we do not reject our model. Instruments used are: wages by location, 
education expenditures, capital controls, country tax rates, political risk,  personal computers per 1,000 people, distance, free trade agreements with the U.S., tariffs and freight costs. 
For a complete description of these variables see Appendix Table A.3. 
 
TABLE 6 
Implied Elasticity of Labor Demand and Allen Elasticity of Substitution Across Alternative Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 





location j with 







(from column (1) 




     Implied Elasticity of Labor Demand ijη  
       (% Change in Li in Response to % Change in wj 
           
     Own Elasticity of Labor Demand      
          OLS -- -0.476 -- -0.356 -0.225 
     
     Elasticity with respect to wages in Low Income       
          Countries      
          OLS 0.002 0.016 0.008 0.041 0.009 
     
          IV 0.028 0.087 0.030 0.045 -- 
     
     Elasticity with respect to wages in High Income       
          Countries      
          OLS -0.034 -0.030 -0.157 0.345 0.070 
     
          IV 0.004 -0.844 -0.446 0.304 -- 
     
     Implied Allen Elasticity of Substitution ijσ  
     
           
     Own Elasticity of Substitution      
          OLS -- -0.815 -- -0.610 -0.131 
     
     Elasticity with respect to Low Income Countries      
     
          OLS .040 0.320 0.161 0.829 0.180 
     
     Elasticity with respect to High Income Countries      
     
          OLS -.092 -.081 -0.422 0.931 0.189 
     
      
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The Sargan Test reports the p-value of Sargan's (1958) test of over-identifying restrictions. It is a test of the joint null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
Instruments used are: education expenditures, capital controls, country tax rates, political risk,  personal computers per 1,000 people, distance, free trade 







FIRST STAGE AND REDUCED FORM ESTIMATES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYMENT, INVESTMENT, AND INTRA-FIRM TRADE 
 Log U.S. 
Employment 























-0.225 0.394 0.222 0.448 0.582 1.442 0.025 0.014 Log Industrial Wages in the U.S. 
 (0.076) (0.092) (0.134) (0.254) (0.175) (0.356) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.070 0.103 -0.332 0.088 0.424 0.131 0.003 -0.009 Log Industrial Wages in High-Income 
Countries (0.024) (0.030) (0.043) (0.082) (0.056) (0.114) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.009 0.016 0.049 -0.073 0.031 0.118 -0.003 0.000 Log Industrial Wages in Low-Income 
Countries (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014) (0.028) (0.000) (0.001) 
-0.038 -0.038  0.120  0.091  0.090  0.046 0.001 0.003 Education Expenditures as a Share of 
GNI (0.013) (0.016) (0.024) (0.045) (0.031) (0.063) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.037 0.027 0.039 -0.091 0.067 -0.038 -0.003 0.000 Log GDP per capita in High-Income 
Countries (ppp) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015) (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.005 0.009 0.014 0.532 0.053 0.618 0.001 0.000 Log GDP per capita in Low-Income 
Countries (ppp) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.022) (0.015) (0.031) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.707  0.362 0.061 0.358 0.278 1.181 0.002 0.024 R&D Spending (% Sales)  
(0.099) (0.119) (0.175) (0.330) (0.228) (0.462) (0.009) (0.008) 
0.205 0.269 -0.092 0.606 1.229 0.925 -0.013 0.010 R&D Spending in High-Income 
Countries (% Sales) (0.135) (0.163) (0.239) (0.451) (0.311) (0.632) (0.013) (0.012) 
-0.187 -0.399 0.416 0.967 -0.051 2.139 -0.033 0.002 R&D Spending in Low-Income 
Countries (% Sales) (0.186) (0.225) (0.329) (0.622) (0.429) (0.872) (0.014 (0.016) 
0.004 -0.484 0.125 -1.028 -0.160 -2.161 0.063 0.008 Import Penetration 
(0.139) (0.168) (0.247) (0.465) (0.321) (0.652) (0.013) (0.012) 
-0.063 -0.178 -0.185 0.684 -0.116 0.604 0.028 -0.014 Import Penetration from Low-Income 
Countries  (0.030) (0.085) (0.125) (0.235) (0.162) (0.330) (0.007) (0.006) 
0.009  0.017 0.012 -0.023 -0.043 -0.068 -0.001 0.000 Median Country Tax Rate 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.028) (0.054) (0.017) (0.025) (0.002) (0.001) 
-0.022 -0.026 -0.103 0.046 -0.006 0.161 0.011 -0.006 Capital Controls  
(0.036) (0.044) (0.064) (0.120) (0.083) (0.169) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.011 0.024 0.038 -0.017 0.068  0.075 0.002 -0.001 Political Risk  
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.037) (0.025) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.000 -0.000 Number of PCs per 1000 people  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.040 0.064 0.149 0.174 0.050 0.259 0.002 -0.003 Distance Between Source and Host 
Country (0.017) (0.020) (0.029) (0.055) (0.038) (0.078) (0.002) (0.001) 
-0.073 -0.224 0.280 -0.244 0.156 0.184 -0.030 0.017 Free Trade Area with the U.S. 
(0.034) (0.053) (0.078) (0.147) (0.102) (0.207) (0.004) (0.004) 
2.564 3.504 5.083 8.456 8.239 6.233 0.237 -0.195 U.S. Tariffs on Imports  
(0.622) (0.751) (1.101) (2.077) (1.433) (2.912) (0.059) (0.053) 
-0.931 -0.706 -0.361 0.183 -1.726 -1.262 0.006 0.042 Freight Costs to U.S.  
(0.424) (0.513) (0.751) (1.417) (0.677) (0.587) (0.040) (0.036) 
F-Statistic (for exclusion of excluded 
instruments in first stage) 
 15.33 16.44 17.18 14.94 13.94 29.13 13.98 
Observations 3368 3368 3368 3368 3368 3368 3368 3368 
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.32 0.30 0.15 
 
TABLE 8 
CALCULATING THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON U.S. EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES
Factors Affecting U.S. Labor 
Demand 
Impact of a 10 
percent Increase 
in Factor on 
Percentage 
Change in U.S. 
Employment 
Actual Increase 
in Factor in BEA 
Sample 
Percentage 
Change in Labor 
Demand (Equals 
Column (1) x 
Column (3)) 
Impact of a 10 
percent Increase 
Percentage 
Change in Labor 
Demand (Equals 
Column (2) x 
Column (3)) 
  in Factor on 
Percentage 




    
 (OLS Estimates)   (Instrumental 
Variable  
 
     
    Estimates)  
      
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Employment    1.02% -0.11 % -18.1% -1.8 % 0.2 % 
High-Income Affiliates 
 
Log Employment  -0.22% -3.79 % 39.8 % -0.9 % -15.1 % 
Low-Income Affiliates 
 
Log Parent Capital Stock 5.61% 1.16 % -21.3 % -11.9 % -2.5 % 
 
Log Capital Stock  -0.36% 1.08 % 52.8 % -1.9 % -5.7 % 
High-Income Affiliates 
 
Log Capital Stock  -0.11% -1.77 % 193.4% -2.1 % -34.2 % 
Low-Income Affiliates 
 
U.S. R&D  -5.31% -5.18 % 3.69 -2.0 % -1.9 % 
Spending Share 
 
U.S. Import 2.03% 4.29 % 14.04 2.9 % 6.0 % 
Penetration 
 
U.S. Import Penetration from 
Low-Income Countries 
0.90 -1.08 % 24.78 2.2 %  -2.7 % 
 
High-Income Affiliates 0.23% 0.45 % 269.83 6.2 % 12.1 % 
Log GDP per capita 
 
Low-Income Affiliates -0.09% -0.90 % 135.04 -1.2 % -12.2 % 
Log GDP Per Capita 
 
Exports to Foreign Affiliates -4.00% -52.24 % 5.5 -2.2 % -28.7 
(Share in Sales) 
 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates -10.64% -43.70 % 4.16 -4.4 % -18.2 













DOES HIRING WORKERS IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES INCREASE A FIRM’S PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL? 
MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED ONLY 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Whether firm 
was in existence in the last period. 















0.155 0.029 0.023 0.105  Employees in Developing Countries 
(015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.052)  
Firm Size (Log of Capital Stock)  0.068 0.067 0.053  
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.023)  
Total Factor Productivity (TFP)   0.066 0.076  
   (0.037) (0.091)  
Profit Margin   1.091 1.563  
  (0.126) (0.325)  
Other Controls? No No Yes Yes  
     
Time Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes  
     
Observations 3584 3584 3584 3584  
     
     
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Probability of survival reflects the likelihood that a firm survived between 
the previous period (five years ago) and the current period.  Additional controls in columns (3) and (4) are the 











Figure 1: All Affiliates 
100 textiles
311 food
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Figure 2: High Income Affiliates 
100 textiles
311 food
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Source: Author’s calculations based on BEA’s outward FDI data 















APPENDIX TABLE A.1: 
COVERAGE OF THE BEA SAMPLE 
Year and Variable Coverage of BEA 
Sample in 
Manufacturing 
Coverage of BEA 
Sample in Services 
Coverage of BEA 





Trade and Other) 
1982    
Total Number of Employees in BEA 
Sample 
11,400,298 619,834 18,341,101 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %)  
Relative to Employment for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
65.66 % 0.92 % 20.45 % 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample 
(U.S. Dollars)  
531,453,350 15,465,862 762,326,385 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) 
Relative to Gross Product for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
84.49 % 3.28 % 31.48 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by 
Firms in the BEA Sample  
113,119,987 251,358 151,396,797 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) 
Relative to Exports ofr All Firms 
operating in the U.S.  
53.36 % NA NA 
1989    
Total Number of Employees in BEA 
Sample 
10,300,000 1,354,103 17,829,543 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %)  
Relative to Employment for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
57.27 % 1.61 % 16.51 % 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample 
(U.S. Dollars)  
652,916,905 47,014,029 999,242,784 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) 
Relative to Gross Product for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
66.35 4.87 24.36 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by 
Firms in the BEA Sample  
183,400,000 659,909 214,832,083 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) 
Relative to Exports ofr All Firms 
operating in the U.S.  
43.08 NA NA 
1994    
Total Number of Employees in BEA 
Sample 
7,906,466 1,763,642 15,098,106 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %)  
Relative to Employment for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
46.45 % 1.93 % 13.21 % 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample 
(U.S. Dollars)  
677,653,022 71,048,064 1,114,413,633 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) 
Relative to Gross Product for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
58.07 % 5.29 % 21.44 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by 
Firms in the BEA Sample  
220,559,766 1,765,125 253,492,391 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) 
Relative to Exports ofr All Firms 
operating in the U.S.  
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1999 
Total Number of Employees in BEA 
Sample 
7,574,910 2,220,174 18,418,115 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %)  
Relative to Employment for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
43.73 % 2.12 % 14.28 % 
Gross Product in the BEA Sample 
(U.S. Dollars)  
798,862,384 118,838,810 1,621,453,486 
Coverage of the BEA Sample (in %) 
Relative to Gross Product for All 
Firms operating in the U.S. 
58.18 % 6.18 % 22.60 % 
Value of Dollar Export Sales by 
Firms in the BEA Sample  
297,668,602 7,872,596 344,427,514 
Coverage of the Bea Sample (in %) 
Relative to Exports ofr All Firms 
operating in the U.S.  




APPENDIX TABLE A.2: 
CROSS CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF THE BEA DATABASE 
 Imposing a Cut-off (Reporting 
Requirement of a Balance Sheet 
Total of at least 7 Million Euros for 
Germany, U.S. reporting 
requirements vary over time, no 
reporting requirement for Sweden)  
Imposing no Cut-off on Germany 
affiliate reporting 
BEA Data   
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1999 
in Germany 
458,744 NA 
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1999 
in Sweden 
67,044 NA 
   
German Government Data (Direct 
U.S. Ownership only) 
  
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1998 466,941 488,866 
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1999 509,537 532,594 




Swedish Government Data   
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1997 
(Majority owned only) 
51,138 NA 
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1998 
yoo(Majority owned only 
61,089 NA 
Employees of U.S. Affiliates in 1999 
(Majority owned only) 
78,621 NA 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.3:  
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Name Source Description 
Exports to Foreign Affiliates (share in sales) U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
goods only; valued f.a.s. at the port of 
exportation 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (share in 
sales) 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
goods only; valued f.a.s. at the port of 
exportation 
Log Capital Stock U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Deflated previous periods net book 
value of property, plant and equipment 
computed for parents, high-income 
affiliates and middle/low income 
affiliates separately. 
Log Wage (Industry level) U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Wages and salaries of employees and 
employer expenditures for all 
employee benefit plans in parents 
computed separately for parents, high-
income affiliates and other affiliates 
and averaged across industries. 
Log Employment  U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Log of the number of full-time and 
part-time employees on the payroll at 
the end of the fiscal year in all 
affiliates.  However, a count taken 
during the year was accepted if it was a 
reasonable proxy for the end-of-year 
number. Computed separately for 
parents, high-income affiliates and 
other affiliates. 
Log Non-Production Worker Employment U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Log of total high-income affiliate 
employment less production workers 
computed for high-income and other 
affiliates. 
Log Production Worker Employment  U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Log of number of production workers 
in high-income affiliates engaged in 
manufacturing activities - for 
manufacturing affiliates computed for 
high-income and other affiliates 
R&D Share U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Expenditures on research and 
development as a percentage of sales. 
Computed separately for U.S. parents, 
affiliates in high-income locations and 
affiliates in low-income locations. 
Profit Margin U.S. Bureau of 
Economic lyAnalysis 
Average across all periods of the ratio 
of net income to sales. 
Total Factor Productivity U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
TFP firm – TFP max by Industry 
U.S. Import Penetration Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2005) 
Imports into the U.S. divided by 
imports into the U.S. plus total 
production in the U.S. less exports 
from the U.S. by year by 4-digit SIC 
1987 revision code industrial 
classification. 
U.S. Import Penetration from Low-Income 
Countries 
Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2005) 
Share of products in an industry 
sourced from at least one country with 
less than 5 percent of U.S. per capita 
GDP 
U.S. Tariffs on Imports Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2005) 
Tariffs on U.S. imports are calculated 
by SIC 1987 industry and by year.  The 
import weighted average tariff is 
calculated as duties divided by the 
customs value.  
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Freight costs to U.S. Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2005) 
Import weighted freight rates, where 
the freight rate is defined as 1 – 
(CIF/FOB).  Freight rates are 
calculated by year and by 4-digit SIC 
1987 revision code industrial 
classification 
Capital Controls in Country of Affiliate International 
Monetary Fund 
0/1 measure of whether a country 
places restrictions on capital 
movements (1 being the most 
restrictive) by country by year. 
Median Tax Rate in Country of Affiliate   
Political Risk in Country of Affiliate   
Education Expenditures The World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 
Adjusted savings: education 
expenditure (% of GNI) 
Free Trade Agreement with Country of 
Affiliate 
Andrew Rose, 
website at Haas 
=1 if U.S.A has a free trade agreement 
with affiliate country 
Log GDP per capita in High-Income Affiliate The World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 
Purchasing power parity dollars 
Log GDP per capita in Low-Income Affiliate The World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 
Purchasing power parity dollars 
Personal Computers per 1000 people The World Bank, 
World Development 
Indicators 
Personal computers (per 1,000 people)  
Distance Andrew Rose, 
website at Haas 
Distance between Source and Host 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.4: 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION FOR LABOR DEMAND WITH INDU.S.TRY WAGES AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
FIXED EFFECT (FE) AND IV ESTIMATES 
 OLS IV 
-0.476 -0.406 Log U.S. Industrial Wages 
(0.019) (0.299) 
-0.030 -0.844 Log Industrial Wages in High-Income Countries 
(0.016) (0.286) 
0.016 0.087 Log Industrial Wages in Low-Income Countries 
(0.009) (0.038) 
0.569 0.606 Log U.S. Capital Stock 
(0.010) (0.223) 
-0.025 -0.014 Log Capital Stock in Affiliates in High Income 
Countries (0.005) (0.001) 
-0.003 -0.012 Log Capital Stock in Affiliates in Low Income 
Countries (0.001) (0.003) 
-0.427 -0.315 R&D Spending (% Sales) 
(0.064) (0.154) 
0.076 0.854 R&D Spending (% Sales) in High-Income Countries 
(0.084) (0.314) 
-0.373 -0.810 R&D Spending (% Sales) in Low-Income Countries 
(0.121) (0.277) 
-0.222 -0.261 Import Penetration 
(0.089) (0.272) 
0.079 -0.090 Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries 
(0.043) (0.040) 
0.016 0.037 Log GDP per capita in High-Income Countries (ppp) 
(0.004) (0.016) 
-0.005 0.017 Log GDP per capita in Low-Income Countries (ppp) 
(0.004) (0.043) 
-0.094 -0.432 Exports to Foreign Affiliates (share in sales) 
(0.020) (0.126) 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (share in sales) -0.809 -6.148 
 (0.135) (4.659) 
Sargan Test  0.186 
Observations 3368 3368 
R-squared 0.63 0.10 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan Test reports the p-value of Sargan’s (1958) test of over 
identifying restriction.  It is a test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  The reported p-value indicates 
the level of confidence with which we do not reject our model.  Instruments used are: education expenditures, capital 
controls, country tax rates, political risk, personal computers per 1,000 people, distance, free trade agreement with 





















APPENDIX TABLE A.5:  
 
CES SPECIFICATION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS RATIO OF LOG EMPLOYMENT AT HOME TO LOG EMPLOYMENT ABROAD 
REPORTED COEFFICIENT IS ON THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE : (LOG) WAGES AT HOME RELATIVE TO WAGES ABROAD 




   
OLS IV 
Home versus abroad   
     No Controls   0.760  
(.018)  
     With Controls .659 0.939 
(.013) (.166) 
Home versus High Income   
     No Controls 0.508  
(.098)  
     With Controls 0.422 1.201 
(.025) (.534) 
Home versus Low Income   
     No Controls -1.178  
(.076)  
     With Controls -0.161 -0.603 
(.025) (.543) 
Observations   
R-squared   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other controls (not reported) include capital stock by location, R and D 
expenditures by location, import penetration and GDP per capita in high and low income countries. See instrument 
































APPENDIX TABLE A.6: 
TRANSLOG COST SHARE SPECIFICATION: DEPENDENT VARIABLE IS US WAGE BILL AS A SHARE OF 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES ON LABOR ACROSS ALL LOCATIONS 
 
 OLS IV 
0.035  0.221 Log U.S. Industrial Wages 
(0.011) (0.081) 
-0.015  -0.039 Log Industrial Wages in High-Income Countries 
(0.008) (0.021) 
-0.005 -0.003 Log Industrial Wages in Low-Income Countries 
(0.002) (0.0001) 
0.040 0.153 Log U.S. Capital Stock 
 (0.004) (0.049) 
-0.075 -0.108 Log Capital Stock of Affiliates in High-Income Countries 
(0.002) (0.017) 
-0.016 -0.030 Log Capital Stock of Affiliates in Low-Income Countries 
(0.001) (0.007) 
-0.008 -0.004 Log GDP per capita ppp $ in High-Income Countries 
(0.002) (0.002) 
-0.004 -0.014 Log GDP per capita ppp $ in Low-Income Countries 
(0.002) (0.007) 
0.049  0.157 R&D Spending (% Sales) 
(0.027) (0.042) 
0.019 0.025 R&D Spending (% Sales) in High-Income Countries 
(0.035) (0.113) 
-0.084 -0.051 R&D Spending (% Sales) in Low-Income Countries 
(0.032) (0.016) 
0.025 -0.325 Import Penetration 
(0.038) (0.119) 
-0.009 0.006 Import Penetration from Low-Wage Countries 
(0.019) (0.066) 
-0.210 -3.614 Exports to Foreign Affiliates (Share in Sales) 
(0.043) (1.698) 
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (Share in Sales) -0.253 -6.806 
 (0.043) (3.291) 
Sargan Test  0.112 
Observations 3368 3368 
R-squared 0.50 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The Sargan Test reports the p-value of Sargan’s (1958) test of over 
identifying restriction.  It is a test of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e. 
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  The reported p-value indicates 
the level of confidence with which we do not reject our model.  Instruments used are: education expenditures, capital 
controls, country tax rates, political risk, personal computers per 1,000 people, distance, free trade agreement with 
U.S. tariffs and freight costs.  For a description of these variables see Appendix A.3. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.7: 
WORLD BANK COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS 
Country Name World Bank Classification 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Dem. Rep. Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom 
High Income: OECD 
Aruba, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, 
Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait, Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, Slovenia, 
United Arab Emirates 
High Income: non OECD 
Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Malta, Mexico, Panama, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, RB 
Upper Middle Income 
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Arab Rep., El 
Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana ,Honduras, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, 
Morocco, Namibia, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey 
Lower Middle Income 
Dem. Rep. Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistán, Vietnam, Rep. Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Low Income 
For the purposes of our analysis, we code as high income countries those classified as either “high 
income: OECD” or “high income: non OECD”. All other countries are classified as middle/low income 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
